This paper presents an analytical framework from which it can be inferred whether sellers or buyers in corporate control transactions value private bene…ts highest. I am thus able to suggest an answer to the question: Are blocks of shares traded because the buyer is a more e¢ cient monitor with high security bene…ts, or because the buyer has high private bene…ts from the control rights that come with the shares? Using voting rights as the vehicle for private bene…ts, I …nd that the selling shareholders in block transactions attach more value to private bene…ts than the buyers. In tender o¤er transactions, the answer is that private bene…ts are insigni…cant to both sides of the transaction. As an alternative measure of the transaction premium, I calculate the abnormal return premium. This represents the stock market's valuation of the transaction. I …nd that the stock market puts a positive premium on the sample transactions. Although this is not con…rmed by the regression results, the market therefore expects higher future security bene…ts. The negative coe¢ cients of relative voting power lend support to this conclusion, but they are not signi…cant. I also …nd that inside shareholders have a very small e¤ect on these results, but that they do attach more value to private bene…ts.
Introduction
Takeovers are important in the dynamic allocation of corporate control, and a wellfunctioning market for corporate control is a key component of an e¤ective governance system (Manne [1965] , Jensen [1988] ). However, with corporate control come con ‡icts of interest and the opportunity to make discretionary decisions. It is widely recognized that the substantial premiums paid for shares in takeovers, which are de…ned as transactions that involves a majority of the voting rights, in part re ‡ect compensation to the selling shareholders for surrendering valuable voting control.
However, corporate control does not necessarily require a majority of the votes. When the remaining shares are dispersed, a minority block may be su¢ cient. Control is taken to mean the ownership of su¢ cient voting power to take decisions on important company matters (Nenova [2003] ). In transactions that involve less than a majority of the votes, the seller also expects some private bene…ts that are not received by other shareholders and that increase with the number of shares transacted (Barclay and Holderness [1989] , Mikkelson and Regassa [1991] ).
Thus, the value of the shares transacted, whether it is a minority or majority, is the expected value of security bene…ts paid to all shareholders in proportion of ownership stake plus the expected value of private bene…ts that are in addition to security bene…ts. This distinction raises the question why blocks of shares are traded. Is it because the buyer is a more e¢ cient monitor with high security bene…ts, or is it because the buyer is a less e¢ cient monitor with high private bene…ts? In other words, is it a way to pro…t from a correction of managerial failure, or is it simply a way to obtain private bene…ts?
I focus on blocks of shares (target …rms with blockholders) because it requires a certain amount of voting rights to realize any signi…cant private bene…ts.
Despite their private nature, the existence of private bene…ts is documented in studies of block transactions (Barclay and Holderness [1989] , Dyck and Zingales [2004] ) and voting premiums (Lease et al. [1983] , Lease et al. [1984] , Zingales [1994] , Nenova [2003] ), 1 but not much is known about their signi…cance relative to security bene…ts in corporate control transactions. This paper develops an analytical framework from which it can be inferred whether sellers or buyers value private bene…ts highest. If the selling shareholders attach more value to private bene…ts than buyers, I consider the transaction socially e¢ cient in the sense that control is passed to shareholders who value the …rm for its security bene…ts, which all shareholders pro…t from (positive externalities of control), and not private bene…ts, which expropriate other, typically small, shareholders (negative externalities of control). A successful transaction thus indicates that the buyers are able to produce enough security bene…ts to compensate the selling shareholders for giving up high private bene…ts without making the transaction unattractive.
In this paper, voting rights are the vehicle for private bene…ts. The key assumption is that private bene…ts are divisible and allocated to each shareholder according to the shareholder's voting power (Zwiebel [1995] ). Voting power is the probability that a block of shares is pivotal for achieving control of a …rm in a voting contest. If the blockholders' probability of being pivotal is high, their share of the …xed payo¤ available to the winning coalition, which is the same as their expected private bene…ts, is high. Private bene…ts therefore depend on the size of the block, but also on the distribution of the remaining shares. A minority shareholder has less in ‡uence when there is another large minority shareholder than when the remaining shareholders are small and dispersed. I use relative voting power, de…ned as voting power divided by voting rights, to distinguish between preferences for security bene…ts and private bene…ts. If the relative voting power is larger than 1, it is considered to re ‡ect a preference for private bene…ts because the costs of private bene…ts are not fully internalized. On the contrary, if it is less than 1, it is 1 There has been some recent work on how to separate voting rights from cash ‡ow rights in more subtle ways than e.g. having multiple classes of common stock. See Hu and Black [2007] for more on this decoupling of economic and voting ownership.
considered to re ‡ect a preference for security bene…ts.
Because I am concerned with blockholders'potential expropriation, I use the ShapleyShubik voting power index. Using the Shapley-Shubik index is analogous to stating that if a coalition is large enough to win, it should avoid accepting additional shareholders, since these new shareholders will demand a share of the payo¤ available to the winning coalition without contributing essential votes to the coalition. In other words, a smaller winning coalition is preferable because it has a larger group of shareholders from whom to expropriate (hence the Shapley-Shubik index captures the fundamental idea of the coalition formation e¤ect introduced in Bennedsen and Wolfenzon [2000] ).
My results are primarily based on analyses using the transaction premium as the dependent variable. Using data on 212 U.S. transactions, I …nd that in block transactions, the selling shareholders typically attach more value to private bene…ts than the buyers.
In tender o¤er transactions, I …nd that private bene…ts are insigni…cant to both sides of the transaction. The sign of the coe¢ cient lends support to the conclusion that the selling shareholders attach more value to private bene…ts though. As an alternative that considers stock market expectations, I also run the regressions with an abnormal return premium as the dependent variable. Again, the sign of the coe¢ cients lends support to the conclusion that the selling shareholders attach more value to private bene…ts, but none of them are statistically signi…cant. The insigni…cance of private bene…ts in the market's estimate of the premium is somewhat expected given the private nature of private bene…ts.
Finally, all shareholders are initially assumed to have the same propensity to participate in voting and similar control abilities. Especially inside shareholders may violate this assumption. To address this concern, I re-calculate all shareholders' voting power in two-stage games, where inside shareholders form ex ante coalitions before entering the voting game as a block (Crespi and Renneboog [2003] ). I …nd this to have only a very small e¤ect on the results. Inside shareholders do, however, seem to attach higher value to private bene…ts than other selling shareholders.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the framework of analysis. This includes sub-sections on block transactions and three di¤erent types of tender o¤er transactions.
Section 3 describes data sources, construction of variables, and presents descriptive statistics of these variables. Section 4 presents my results in more detail, and section 5 concludes.
Framework of analysis
Consider a …rm with an incumbent blockholder owning a fraction w 1 of the voting rights, the remaining (1 w 1 ) being dispersed among many small shareholders. The …rm is approached by a potential investor. Under the incumbent blockholder, security bene…ts are y S and private bene…ts are z S . Under the potential investor, security bene…ts are y B and private bene…ts are z B .
2 It is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a control transfer that the sum of expected security bene…ts and expected private bene…ts under the buyer's control is equal to or larger than the sum under the seller. Finally, there are no restrictions on the seller's prior share of voting rights, the share of voting rights sought, or the structure of the bid.
Whether or not a control transfer will take place may depend on whether, and to what extent, the law provides minority shareholders with rights to participate in (or otherwise bene…t from) the transaction. In the US, the general rule has been that minority shareholders do not have a right to participate (Bebchuk [1994] ).
Block transactions
In absence of a mandatory bid rule in the company law, the seller and the buyer are not obliged to let the small shareholders participate in the control transaction, and control can be transferred through a privately negotiated block transaction on mutually agreeable terms. Hence, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a control transfer is that the block has a higher value under the buyer's control than under the seller's, or formally that w 1 y B + z B w 1 y S + z S holds. This is the result from Bebchuk [1994] and Burkart and Panunzi [2003] . Both assume that the block provides e¤ective control of the …rm and thus that all private bene…ts accrue to the block.
The assumption that private bene…ts accrue only to the blockholder is common in the corporate governance literature; it comes from the persistent view that ownership is dispersed. However, even in the US where publicly traded …rms stand out as having more widely dispersed ownership structures, many …rms have signi…cant blockholders (Gadhoum et al. [2005] and Dlugosz et al. [2006] ).
Drawing on Zwiebel [1995] , I assume that private bene…ts do not accrue only to the controlling shareholder, that private bene…ts are in fact divisible, and that they are allocated to each member of the controlling coalition according to voting power. In this case, the necessary and su¢ cient condition is that w 1 y B + 1 z B w 1 y S + 1 z S , or, equivalently, that
where 1 is the voting power of the block, and thus the expected share of private bene…ts going to the block. It is important to recognize that the size of the block and thus the voting power is constant. Private bene…ts of the buyer and seller di¤er because of di¤erent expectations to the …xed payo¤ available to the winning coalition. 3 If the blockholder's 3 Sources of payo¤ include self-dealing such as transfer pricing, self-served …nancial transactions such as fraction of the voting rights exceeds a simple majority of 50% plus one vote, 1 = 1 and I get the same result as Bebchuk [1994] and Burkart and Panunzi [2003] . Equation (1) is only di¤erent when minority blocks are traded. The signi…cance of private bene…ts relative to security bene…ts is then less than what it would otherwise be.
My main interest in this paper is exactly the signi…cance of private bene…ts relative to security bene…ts in corporate control transactions. The transaction price, and thus the transaction premium, is a solution to the bargaining game between the seller and the buyer; the lower bound being the seller's valuation of the block, and the upper bound being the buyer's valuation of the block. It does not take into account that a control transfer might cause negative externalities, i.e. that it might be detrimental to the small shareholders; it depends only on the two parties'expected security bene…ts and private bene…ts. The buyer might be a less e¢ cient monitor of the …rm with less value attached to security bene…ts, but with su¢ ciently large private bene…ts, the control transfer may happen anyway. Asymmetric information between the seller and the buyer should be re ‡ected in the transaction price. Now, divide equation (1) by w 1 and de…ne the block's relative voting power as 1 1 =w 1 . By rearranging, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for a control transfer be-
If the buyer is indeed a less e¢ cient monitor of the …rm with high private bene…ts, then both sides of the inequality in equation (2) are negative. A transaction would require the di¤erence in security bene…ts to be less than the di¤erence in private bene…ts, which depends directly on 1 . Notice that 1 tells us something about the marginal values. If directed equity issuance, or, if the large shareholder is also the …rm's management, excessive compensation (Djankov et al. [2005] ).
it is less than 1, the block's marginal value of security bene…ts is larger than the marginal value of private bene…ts. If it is larger than 1, the marginal value of private bene…ts is larger than the marginal value of security bene…ts.
Consider the situation in which 1 < 1 and z S < z B . The buyer can then a¤ord a decrease in security bene…ts, i.e. y B < y S . However, because the marginal value of security bene…ts is higher than the marginal value of private bene…ts, the buyer cannot a¤ord a one-to-one decrease. If z S > z B , the buyer can use security bene…ts to compensate the seller for giving up large (larger) private bene…ts. In order for the transaction to succeed, the seller has to earn more security bene…ts, i.e. y B > y S . But because of the marginal e¤ects, this can be done with a di¤erence in di¤erences less than one-to-one. Now, consider the situation in which 1 > 1 and z S < z B . In this situation, the buyer can a¤ord a larger than one-to-one decrease in security bene…ts, i.e. y B << y S , because the marginal value of private bene…ts is larger than that of security bene…ts. Similarly, in the opposite situation in which z S > z B , the buyer has to earn more security bene…ts,
i.e. y B >> y S .
To get an idea of the empirical implications, it is useful to de…ne a benchmark. I assume that the solution to the bargaining game between the seller and the buyer is a Nash equilibrium. In such a Nash equilibrium, the two parties divide the surplus evenly.
From the comparative analysis, we see that the di¤erence between y B and y S becomes larger when 1 increases, which means that the total surplus from the transaction increases when the buyer's private bene…ts are larger than the seller's private bene…ts, and that it decreases when the seller's private bene…ts are larger than the buyer's private bene…ts.
Proposition 1 In terms of the relationship between the transaction premium and the block's relative voting power, we would thus expect a positive relation when z S < z B and a negative relation when z S > z B .
Tender o¤ers
Most of the ideas from block transactions carries over to tender o¤ers. Nonetheless, tender o¤ers are public o¤ers made to all shareholders, and I have to change the condition in equation (1) to capture this. Tender decisions are made by all shareholders where each shareholder individually evaluates the necessary condition given its own parameter values for w and . A control transfer now requires the buyer to o¤er a price that the blockholder, the small shareholders or both favor. This price is non-negotiable so there is no bargaining game between the seller and the buyer. How the surplus is divided depends solely on the buyer through his or her choice of price, and therefore the transaction premium is not a function of the relative power per se. However, since all shareholders, due to their nonatomistic characterization, are pivotal with some positive probability, they individually compare the value under the buyer not to the bid price (contrary to the Grossman and Hart [1980] case with atomistic shareholders and free-riding) but to the current market value when deciding whether to tender their shares. Private bene…ts increase the price that the buyer has to o¤er to succeed, and the transaction premium is a function of the relative power after all.
The blockholder
For the blockholder, my expectation does not change. The necessary and su¢ cient condition is exactly the same as in equation (2), and the comparative analysis are as described in section 2.1.
Proposition 2 In terms of the relationship between the transaction premium and the block's relative voting power, we would thus expect a positive relation when z S < z B and a negative relation when z S > z B .
The small shareholders
For the small shareholders, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for a control transfer is
or, equivalently, that
where S P n i=2 i = P n i=2 w i is the relative voting power of all the small shareholders. For this de…nition of relative voting power to be testable, I have to assume that the small shareholders are identical and homogeneous in their decision to tender. It is possible to have negative externalities, although it is less likely that the small shareholders expropriate the blockholder than the other way around. Notice that equation (3) is the same as (1 w 1 )(y B y S ) + (1small shareholders' relative voting power, we would thus expect a positive relation when z S < z B and a negative relation when z S > z B .
Despite the opposing behavior of the blockholder and the small shareholders in their decision to tender, I thus come to expect the same general result. Regardless of whoever tenders, we expect the transaction premium to increase in relative voting power and the sign of the parameter estimate to state whether the seller or the buyer has more value attached to private bene…ts. Next, I analyze the intersection of these two cases to see if this result holds when both groups tender at the same time.
The blockholder and the small shareholders
A control transfer that at the same time is valuable for both the blockholder and the small shareholders requires that
In this case, a transaction depends on the relative voting power that maximizes the right hand side of equation (4). If the necessary condition is satis…ed, there can be no negative externalities. In fact, the max function aligns the interests of the two groups of shareholders in terms of transaction price and thus transaction premium. The source of this interdependence is the buyer's demand for shares and pre-bid consideration of private bene…ts. Unfortunately, the max function causes some ambiguity in the comparative analysis, since, by construction, the relative voting power of one group of shareholders cannot increase without a decrease in the relative voting power of another group of shareholders.
Consider the situation in which 1 < 1; S > 1; and z S < z B . Because of larger private bene…ts, the buyer can a¤ord a decrease in security bene…ts, i.e. y B < y S , and, in this situation, the maximum decrease depends on the small shareholders, who have the largest relative voting power. Since their marginal value of private bene…ts is larger than that of security bene…ts, the buyer can a¤ord a larger than one-to-one decrease in security bene…ts, i.e. y B << y S . If z S > z B , the buyer must use security bene…ts to compensate the seller for giving up larger private bene…ts, i.e. y B > y S , and because of the marginal e¤ects, a transfer of control requires that the buyer expects to earn more security bene…ts,
i.e. y B >> y S . Now, consider the situation in which 1 > 1; S < 1; and z S < z B . The maximum decrease in security bene…ts depends on the blockholder, and because the marginal value of private bene…ts is larger than the marginal value of security bene…ts, the buyer can, as before, a¤ord a larger than one-to-one decrease, i.e. y B << y S . However, whether the buyer can a¤ord an even larger decrease in security bene…ts depends on how much S drops below 1 when 1 raises above 1. This is where the comparative analysis become ambiguous. If the di¤erence between 1 and S is larger than the prior di¤erence between S and 1 , then y B <<< y S . If the di¤erence between 1 and S is smaller than the prior di¤erence between S and 1 , the di¤erence between y B and y S also becomes smaller. A similar argument can be made in the opposite situation in which z S > z B . In either case, the di¤erence between y B and y S in the intersection is at least as large as the di¤erence between y B and y S in the separate cases (this is because of the max function).
The ambiguity disappears if I use the absolute di¤erence between 1 and S instead of 1 to derive the empirical expectation. As this di¤erence increases, the di¤erence between y B and y S also increases. In a Nash equilibrium, an increase in the absolute di¤erence between 1 and S results in a higher transaction price and thus a higher transaction premium. The larger the di¤erence is the higher is the valuation of private bene…ts (by either the blockholder or the small shareholders) and the price that the buyer is willing to pay.
Proposition 4 In terms of the relationship between the transaction premium and the absolute di¤erence between the blockholder's relative voting power and the small shareholders'relative voting power, we would thus expect a positive relation when z S < z B and a negative relation when z S > z B .
Data and sample construction
My transaction data come from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database.
I use data on transactions for majorities, remaining interests, tender o¤ers, and minority stake purchases involving U.S. targets. I require that transactions are completed, and that values necessary for computing the transaction premium are available. I also require that target …rms'ticker symbols can be matched with ownership data from Dlugosz et al.
[ 2006] , who have recorded the distribution of voting rights in a large sample of large U.S.
…rms with only one class of common stock in the period from 1996 to 2001. 4 These data are especially suitable for this paper because they focus explicitly on both blockholders and voting rights.
For a match to enter the sample, I furthermore require that target …rms'ownership structures are known at some date less than 1 year prior to the transaction. The fact that the ownership data are not from the exact same date does not cause a serious problem, because ownership structures tend to be stable over time (Bebchuk and Roe [1999] ).
One caveat should be mentioned though: prior to corporate control transfers, ownership structures may be more unstable because of a potential investor's creeping accumulation of shares.
To control for idiosyncratic characteristics, I collect accounting variables for each target …rm from Compustat Industrial Annual. Finally, I require that target …rms'ticker symbols can be matched with daily stock price data from CRSP and corporate governance data from Gompers et al. [2003] . The balanced sample is reduced to 212 transactions. value-weighted market model with parameters estimated using daily returns for the year ending on day 64 before the announcement date. Regression results do not change when the abnormal return premium is calculated over post transaction days only.
Relative voting power
My key right hand side variable is the relative voting power, which is de…ned as voting power divided by voting weight. My choice of power index is motivated by the notion of power as the expected relative share of bene…ts available to the controlling coalition of shareholders (Felsenthal and Machover [1998] Formally, shareholder i's power index value is
where s is the number of shareholders in the controlling coalition S, and n is the number of shareholders in the …rm. The characteristic function v indicates the value of S. The power index satis…es the condition for a relative power index, as the shareholders'power index values add up to 1. Calculations are carried out using a generating function algorithm with a simple majority requirement.
Calculations of voting power and relative voting power require a complete account of the distribution of votes, but the available ownership structure data only include those shareholders with at least 5% of the voting rights (due to disclosure requirements). Consequently, I have to make an assumption about the small shareholders. Two procedures can be found in the literature. One assumes that the unobserved shareholders are not in ‡uential, and the other assumes that they are in ‡uential with some positive probability.
The latter is equivalent to my assumption about non-atomistic shareholders, in which case I should use a …nite representation such as the one proposed by Guedes and Loureiro [2002] to approximate the actual distribution of votes. It simply assumes that each small shareholder holds 1% of the votes and then adds shareholders until the joint votes of all shareholders add up to 100%.
Relative voting power in a two-stage game
The power index value in equation (5) assumes that each coalition is formed with equal probability. It is possible that the relative voting power is better described by a twostage voting game, since it may be easier for speci…c classes of shareholders to form ex ante coalitions before entering the voting game as a block (Crespi and Renneboog [2003] ). Inside shareholders may have similar private bene…ts, and they may combine their ownership stakes to a substantial block of voting power to extract private bene…ts from outside shareholders (see Stulz [1988] for a theoretical model, and McConnell and Servaes [1990] for empirical support). To test whether this is the case, I re-calculate the relative voting power for all shareholders in a two-stage voting game with insiders forming ex ante coalitions.
The ownership structure data classify those shareholders with at least 5% of the voting rights into …ve categories. These are o¢ cer, director, a¢ liated entity, employee share ownership plan, and outside blockholder. Although employees'objectives in many cases di¤er from those of o¢ cers and directors, trustees of employee share ownership plans are considered insiders. In accordance with Schedule 14a of the Security Exchange Act of 1934, the proxy statements and therefore also the data contain insider ownership below 5%. I de…ne the block of inside shareholders as 1 minus the sum of outside blockholders and let this block enter the voting game with the remaining outside blockholders and small shareholders. Under Section 12 of the Act, anyone who own more than 10% of the shares is considered an insider. This consideration is not, however, used in the data. A blockholder is only considered an insider if she belongs to one of the …rst four categories.
Controls
There are a number of characteristics about the transaction, the seller, and the buyer that are likely to be correlated with the transaction premium, and that I should control for in the regression models. These control variables are taken from papers explaining the Qualitatively, it does not matter whether I use all cash or any cash. This literature also …nds that premiums tend to be lower when the buyer holds a toehold in the target, when the target is large, when the target is pro…table, and when that target leverage is ambiguous since it constrains managerial discretion but also increases size.
In addition, I construct a dummy variable for cross-border transactions, a dummy variable for two-digit Standard Industrial Classi…cation code intra-industry transactions, and a dummy variable for the buyers' post-transaction ownership stake. Transactions with buyers from countries with less investor protection are likely to yield a higher price, and hence a higher transaction premium, because they are better able to expropriate corporate resources (Dyck and Zingales [2004] This is a trade-o¤ between the loss of private bene…ts from owning a smaller fraction of the shares and the gain from transferring some of the costs to other shareholders. If there is a net gain, the seller is also likely to agree on a price below the current market value. I choose to include observations below zero. The average transaction premium received by the selling shareholders is then 27.20%. This is very close to the average abnormal return premium, which is 25.08%, and suggests that the stock market considers the control transfer e¢ cient, i.e. expects higher future security bene…ts.
Descriptive statistics
The average largest shareholder has 14.95% of the voting rights, and the average …rm respectively. If the relative voting power is smaller than 1, as is the case for the small shareholders, the marginal value of security bene…ts is larger than the marginal value of 6 The cost of private bene…ts is due to the fact that the incumbent block holder fails to internalize the negative impact that a control transfer has on the (1 w) widely held shares, and the fact that private bene…ts are extracted (in part) at the expense of security bene…ts (Burkart and Panunzi [2003] ). private bene…ts. On the other hand, if it is larger than 1, as is the case for the largest shareholder, the marginal value of private bene…ts is larger than the marginal value of security bene…ts. Since we do not have an explicit model for the relation between voting power and private bene…ts, I cannot make further inferences about the deviation from 1.
Yet, these relative voting power values may be misleading as they assume that every shareholder has a similar propensity to participate in voting coalitions and similar control abilities. The empirical evidence that powerful inside shareholders entrench outside shareholders motivates the re-calculation of relative voting power in a two-stage voting game with insiders forming ex ante coalitions. Table 1 shows that the average e¤ect of this is small. The relative voting power for the largest shareholder, whether this is a single shareholder or a group of inside shareholders, increases to 1.17. There is a corresponding decrease in the relative voting power of the small shareholders.
Tender o¤ers account for about 16% of the sample transactions. Cash is used as a mode of payment in more than 70% of the transactions (not tabulated), and the average percentage of total consideration paid in cash is 90. In 25% of the target …rms, the buyer owned shares in the …rm six months prior to the transaction. Note that if the buyer qua the toehold is the largest shareholder, the analytical framework does not make sense, and the observation should be removed from the data set. In 58% of the transaction, the buyer owns the majority of voting rights after the transaction. In 116 …rms, the buyer owns all voting rights after the transaction (not tabulated).
About 14% of the transactions are cross-border with a non-U.S. entity buying into a U.S. …rm. While this means that most buyers submit to higher investor protection, buyers from countries with less investor protection are nonetheless better able to expropriate corporate resources. Therefore, I calculate the di¤erence in legal protection and …nd it to be 2.13, which suggests that there is scope for signi…cant private bene…ts for the buyer.
A similar argument can be made for transactions within the same industry, i.e. buyers from the same industry are better able to expropriate corporate resources in the target …rm. About 47% of the transactions are intra-industry. In the next section, I will look at the e¤ect of buying into high private bene…t industries.
So far, I have postponed the distinction between block transactions and tender o¤er transactions, also presented in table 1. First, note that the transaction premium as well as the abnormal return premium is signi…cantly higher in tender o¤ers than in block transactions. This is because the buyer must hand over all improvements in security bene…ts to the incumbent shareholders to make them tender; the buyer's o¤ered price must match the post-transaction share value (Grossman and Hart [1980] ). However, because the buyer is not compensated ex ante for abstaining from extracting private bene…ts ex post, and because of the tendering shareholders'non-atomistic characterization, such gains do exist in tender o¤ers despite the absence of private negotiations. While this post transaction moral hazard and associated ine¢ ciency is troublesome, private bene…ts are one of the suggestions in Grossman and Hart [1980] to prevent failure of value increasing (tender o¤er) bids.
Second, note that the wedge in relative voting power between the largest shareholder and the small shareholders is larger in tender o¤ers than in block transactions. Target …rms in completed tender o¤er transactions apparently have more dispersed ownership structures, which is not surprising though. However, because there is at least one blockholder in each sample …rm, equation (4) applies as here the max function aligns the interest of the two groups of shareholders in terms of transaction price. In the case of tender o¤ers, the wedge is therefore of no concern in regard to potential extraction of private bene…ts by the large shareholder at the expense of the small shareholders.
Third, note that a tender o¤er more frequently results in the buyer having a posttransaction majority; that negotiations of block transactions tend to happen between U.S. entities (only 11% are cross-border); that target …rms in tender o¤er transactions tend to have better corporate governance (although the di¤erence is negligible); and that intra-industry transactions, which are a type of transaction in which we would expect relatively high private bene…ts, are less frequent in block transactions.
Results
In this section, I present the empirical results of private bene…ts' signi…cance relative to security bene…ts in corporate control transactions. My conjectures are formulated in propositions 1 to 4. In the tender o¤er transactions in my data set, however, I do not know who tenders and who does not tender. In the empirical model I am therefore not able to take propositions 2 and 3 into account.
The main model is an ordinary least squares model that includes data on 212 transactions. The data is cross-sectional in nature; although it spans a 6-year period from 1996 to 2001, each …rm only enters the sample once. On the basis of the discussion in the previous section, the following model is estimated.
The model has been checked for collinearities among the regressor variables (using the variance in ‡ation factor) without causing any changes. The model is estimated for both premium variables with one-stage and two-stage games, respectively. Tables 2 and   3 report parameter estimates and White consistent t-statistics.
To recap, voting rights are the vehicle for private bene…ts, and voting power measures the in ‡uence carried by voting rights. If a share of voting rights provides more in ‡uence than the investment warrants pro rate (due to the speci…c structure of ownership), the shareholder has a marginal preference for private bene…ts (because all associated costs are not fully internalized). In that case, I conjecture that there is a positive relation between the shareholder's relative voting power (valuation of private bene…ts) and the transaction price. If the model returns a negative estimate, I conjecture that the shareholder has a marginal preference for security bene…ts and values the transaction for security bene…ts instead of private bene…ts.
In table 2, with transaction premium as the dependent variable, the negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient of the largest shareholder's relative voting power lends support to the conclusion that, in block transactions, the selling shareholders attach more value to private bene…ts than the buyers. This conclusion is reinforced by looking at the interaction between intra-industry transactions and private bene…t industries; 7 it shows that investors buying into these industries need to compensate the selling shareholders for giving up high private bene…ts. The coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant. The coe¢ cient of intra-industry is also positive but not of the same magnitude and not signi…cant.
The coe¢ cient of the absolute di¤erence between the blockholder's relative voting power and the small shareholders'relative voting power is negative but not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The reason for this insigni…cance of private bene…ts in tender o¤ers is unclear. On the one hand, private bene…ts could be decisive for the buyer in making a successful tender o¤er in which all improvements in security bene…ts have to go to the selling shareholders in order to prevent them from free riding. There are other ways to solve the free rider problem though: for example, buying a stake prior to the tender o¤er.
However, the coe¢ cient of toehold turns out to be insigni…cant as well. On the other hand, the selling shareholders, due to the dispersed ownership structure (and hence low relative voting power) that typically characterizes …rms that receive tender o¤ers, do not attach notable value to private bene…ts. Besides, voting power does not translate into bargaining power that leads to a higher premium. Finally, the high amount of shares tendered (remember that the empirical testing of the framework only considers those tender o¤ers that at the same time are valuable to both the blockholder and the small shareholders) results in a high post-transaction voting stake for the buyer (the posttransaction dummy variable is one in 82% of the tender o¤er transactions relative to 53% in block transactions), which means that more costs of private bene…ts are internalized.
Pushing the argument that private bene…ts are important further, I run regressions in which I assume that inside shareholders form coalitions before entering the voting game with outside shareholders (two-stage game). Panel B presents the results. It turns out to have only a small qualitative e¤ect on the results. While the number of shareholders that participate in the voting game decreases, the increase in inside shareholders'voting stake is not large enough to cause any signi…cant changes in the e¤ect of the relative voting power (the increase in relative voting power is from 1.15 to 1.17, cf. table 1).
The coe¢ cient of the largest shareholder's relative voting power is slightly lower at -0.20, indicating that inside shareholders attach more value to private bene…ts than outside shareholders.
The coe¢ cient of the Governance Index lends support to this conclusion. It is supposed to control for potential entrenchment by insiders prior to their ex ante coalition formation in the two-stage game. The parameter estimate is zero. Again, the reason could be that inside shareholders are infrequent and relatively small in this sample. Another reason could be that the observed (outside) ownership structure is a market response to the corporate governance environment that e¤ectively remove any signi…cant inside shareholder private bene…ts.
Only a few control variables have signi…cant parameter estimates. I have already mentioned the positive e¤ect of buying into private bene…t industries. The other signi…cant control variable is the post-transaction majority variable. A majority stake quali…es for outright control and potentially larger private bene…ts. Given the relative voting power results, buyers however do not attach as much value to private bene…ts as sellers. In other words, it is the value that they attach to security bene…ts that makes the transaction succeed. The positive coe¢ cient therefore lends support to the conclusion that the buyer is willing to pay a higher premium for obtaining a controlling stake (regardless of whether a majority stake is transacted or the transacted shares together with the buyer's toehold constitute a majority) in order to have the necessary power to make improvements in security bene…ts.
In table 3 panel A, with abnormal return premium as the dependent variable, all variables except private bene…t industry have insigni…cant parameter estimates. The event study analysis mixes the market's estimate of the premium with the likelihood of the transaction going through. Clearly, the market's estimate of the premium does not take into consideration the private bene…ts from the in ‡uence that comes with the number of shares transacted. This is not surprising given the opaque nature of private bene…ts.
If the target …rm belongs to a private bene…t industry, it does, however, take this into consideration. The coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant. Again, this can be interpreted as compensation to the selling shareholders for surrendering voting control and giving up high private bene…ts. The coe¢ cient is also considerably higher than the corresponding coe¢ cient in table 2, where the dependent variable is the transaction premium.
The e¤ect of inside shareholders forming coalitions before entering the voting game with outside shareholders (two-stage game in panel B) does not change this result. Size and pro…tability become signi…cant control variables; otherwise no parameter estimates are qualitatively di¤erent.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on dynamic allocation of corporate control by presenting an analytical framework from which it can be inferred whether sellers or buyers value private bene…ts highest. I am thus able to suggest an answer to the question: Are blocks of shares traded because the buyer is a more e¢ cient monitor with high security bene…ts, or because the buyer has high private bene…ts from the control rights that come with the shares?
The empirical results are based on a U.S. data set covering 179 block transactions and 33 tender o¤er transactions. For block transactions, with transaction premium as the dependent variable, the answer is that the selling shareholders attach more value to private bene…ts than the buyers. These transactions are therefore socially e¢ cient in the sense that control is passed to shareholders who value the …rms for their security bene…ts, which all shareholders pro…t from (positive externalities of control), and not for private bene…ts, which expropriates other, typically small, shareholders (negative externalities of control).
In tender o¤er transactions, also with transaction premium as the dependent variable, the answer is that private bene…ts are insigni…cant to both sides of the transaction. I put forward two reasons for this. First, tender o¤er targets typically have a dispersed ownership structure, where each selling shareholder has low relative voting power and hence low private bene…ts. Second, the high amount of shares tendered (remember that the empirical testing of the framework only considers those tender o¤ers that at the same time are valuable to both the blockholder and the small shareholders) results in a high post-transaction voting stake for the buyer, which means that more costs of private bene…ts are internalized. Moral hazard is alleviated by the size of the bidder's …nal holding.
As an alternative measure of the transaction premium, I calculate the abnormal return premium. This represents the stock market's valuation of the transaction. I …nd that the stock market puts a positive premium on the sample transactions. Although this is not con…rmed by the regression results, the market therefore expects higher future security bene…ts. The negative coe¢ cients of relative voting power lend support to this conclusion, but they are not signi…cant. The insigni…cance of private bene…ts in the market's estimate of the premium is somewhat expected given the opaque nature of private bene…ts.
In this paper, voting rights are the vehicle for private bene…ts. The key assumption is that private bene…ts are divisible and allocated to each shareholder according to the shareholder's strategic importance in forming controlling coalitions (Shapley and Shubik [1954] voting power). This approach hinges on two assumptions. First, that there are bene…ts to large shareholders from being in control. Second, that there is a positive probability that such a blockholder will demand marginal votes in order to attain control.
I use relative voting power to distinguish between preferences for security bene…ts and private bene…ts. If the relative voting power is larger than 1, it is considered to re ‡ect a preference for private bene…ts. On the contrary, if it is less than 1, it is considered to re ‡ect a preference for security bene…ts.
Finally, all shareholders are assumed to have the same propensity to participate in voting and similar control abilities. Especially inside shareholders may violate this assumption. To address this concern, I re-calculate all shareholders'voting power in two-stage games, where inside shareholders form ex ante coalitions before entering the voting game as a block. I …nd this to have only a very small e¤ect on the results. Inside shareholders do, however, seem to attach higher value to private bene…ts (require higher compensations) than other selling shareholders. it is considered a block transaction. Cash is the value paid in cash divided by total value of consideration (SDC percentage of consideration paid in cash). Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer owned common stock in the target six months prior to the transaction and zero otherwise (SDC percentage held prior to transaction). Post-transaction majority is a dummy equal to one if the buyer holds a majority of the voting rights after the transaction (SDC percentage owned after transaction). Cross-border transaction is a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction involves a foreign buyer and zero otherwise (SDC target nation and acquirer nation, respectively). Legal di¤erence is a measure of the di¤erence in legal protection between the two countries based on the La Porta et al. [1998] antidirector index. The index has a range from 0 to 5, where a low value indicates weak protection, and a high value indicates strong protection. Governance Index is a proxy for the balance of power between shareholders and managers based on provisions that restrict shareholders' rights (see Gompers et al. [2003] for details). The index has a range from 1 to 24, where a low value indicates strong shareholder power, and a high value indicates strong managerial power. Finally, intra-industry transaction is a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction involves two …rms with the same two-digit Standard Industrial Classi…cation code and zero otherwise (SDC target primary SIC code and acquirer primary SIC code, respectively). Table 2 : Ordinary least squares estimates of the relation between the transaction premium and relative voting power
The dependent variable is the transaction premium de…ned as [(buyer's o¤er/target's pre-bid market value of equity)-1], where the value of the buyer's o¤er is computed using, in order of availability, the sum of the value of the considerations o¤ered, the initial o¤er price, or the …nal o¤er price as reported in SDC. The independent variables are all measured for the target …rm, and all accounting variables are calculated over the year prior to the acquisition. Accounting variables are calculated using COMPUSTAT data. 1 is the relative voting power of the largest shareholder. Block is a dummy variable equal to one if SDC records the transaction as a transaction for majority, remaining interest, or minority stake purchase and zero otherwise. not matter whether I use all cash or any cash. Market-timing is a dummy variable equal to one in years with increasing market values and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer owned common stock in the target six months prior to the transaction or zero otherwise (SDC percentage held prior to transaction). The results do not change qualitatively if the toehold dummy variable is de…ned at the announcement date instead. Post-transaction majority is a dummy equal to one if the buyer holds a majority of the voting rights after the transaction (SDC percentage owned after transaction). Size is the log of sales (COMPUSTAT item 12). Pro…tability is the ratio of earnings to equity (COMPUSTAT items 20 and 60). Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity (COMPUSTAT items 9 and 60). Cross-border transaction is a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction involves two …rms from the same nation and zero otherwise (SDC target nation and acquirer nation, respectively), and legal di¤erence is a measure of the di¤erence in legal protection between the two countries based on the La Porta et al. [1998] antidirector index. Intra-industry transaction is a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction involves two …rms from the same primary Standard Industrial Classi…cation code and zero otherwise (SDC target primary SIC code and acquirer primary SIC code, respectively). Private bene…t industry is an interaction e¤ect between intra-industry transaction and a dummy variable that equals one if the target …rm belongs to a private bene…t industry and zero otherwise. Governance Index is a proxy for the balance of power between shareholders and managers based on provisions that restrict shareholders'rights (see Gompers et al. [2003] for details). The index has a range from 1 to 24, where a low value indicates strong shareholder power, and a high value indicates strong managerial power. T-statistics are White consistent. Table 3 : Ordinary least squares estimates of the relation between the abnormal return premium and relative voting power
The dependent variable is the abnormal return premium de…ned as the sum of abnormal returns of the target …rm's shares in the period from 63 days before to 126 days after the announcement date. The independent variables are all measured for the target …rm, and all accounting variables are calculated over the year prior to the acquisition. Accounting variables are calculated using COMPUSTAT data. 1 is the relative voting power of the largest shareholder. Block is a dummy variable equal to one if SDC records the transaction as a transaction for majority, remaining interest, or minority stake purchase and zero otherwise. j 1 S j is the absolute di¤erence between the relative voting power of the largest shareholder and the small shareholders. Tender is a dummy variable equal to one if SDC records that the transaction involved a tender o¤er and zero otherwise. Voting power is calculated as Shapley and Shubik [1954] voting power. In panel A, it is calculated in a one-stage game without reference to preferences. In panel B, it is calculated in a two-stage game where inside shareholders form ex ante coalitions before entering the voting game as a block. Cash is a dummy variable equal to one if part of the consideration is paid in cash and zero otherwise (SDC percentage of consideration paid in cash). Qualitatively, it does not matter whether I use all cash or any cash. Market-timing is a dummy variable equal to one in years with increasing market values and zero otherwise. Toehold is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer owned common stock in the target six months prior to the transaction and zero otherwise (SDC percentage held prior to transaction). Results do not change qualitatively if the toehold dummy variable is de…ned at the announcement date instead. Post-transaction majority is a dummy equal to one if the buyer holds a majority of the voting rights after the transaction (SDC percentage owned after transaction). Size is the log of sales (COMPUSTAT item 12). Pro…tability is the ratio of earnings to equity (COMPUSTAT items 20 and 60). Leverage is the ratio of debt to equity (COMPUSTAT items 9 and 60). Cross-border transaction is a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction involves two …rms from the same nation and zero otherwise (SDC target nation and acquirer nation, respectively), and legal di¤erence is a measure of the di¤erence in legal protection between the two countries based on the La Porta et al. [1998] antidirector index. Intra-industry transaction is a dummy variable equal to one if the transaction involves two …rms from the same primary Standard Industrial Classi…cation code and zero otherwise (SDC target primary SIC code and acquirer primary SIC code, respectively). Private bene…t industry is an interaction e¤ect between intra-industry transaction and a dummy variable that equals one if the target …rm belongs to a private bene…t industry and zero otherwise. Governance Index is a proxy for the balance of power between shareholders and managers based on provisions that restrict shareholders'rights (see Gompers et al. [2003] for details). The index has a range from 1 to 24, where a low value indicates strong shareholder power, and a high value indicates strong managerial power. T-statistics are White consistent. 
